The challenging stock market conditions of the last two years may have companies questioning their continued use of stock options. Our analysis of stock options granted in 2022 among S&P 500 companies finds that the majority of stock options (54% of all option grants) granted are underwater (i.e., the current stock price is below the option exercise price) and on average, the stock options are 23% underwater. That means that for the average executive holding stock options granted in 2022, the stock price would have to increase by more than 30% for the stock option to have any intrinsic value.

Recent Stock Option Struggles

CAP analyzed CEO equity grants among S&P 500 companies to understand the degree to which stock options were out-of-the-money, given the challenging stock price environment. It should be noted that many companies have moved away from granting stock options. In fact, among the S&P 500, only 43% of CEOs received stock options. This reflects a broad market shift where options have been replaced by performance share units and restricted stock units.

S&P 500	%
Companies Granting Stock Options	43%
Stock Option Grants Currently Underwater	54%
Average % Change from Exercise Price	-23%

As of November 30, 2023, 54% of these awards are underwater which means they currently have no value. Among these underwater awards, the current share price is 23% below the exercise price, on average. While it is still early in the vesting schedule for these awards, share price depreciation at such levels may leave employees wondering if their options will have realizable value as it will take significant stock price appreciation to get back to break-even.

In looking more closely at the sample, we find that there is a broad range of how far out-of-the-money stock options are across companies. For example, 11% of the stock options are more than 50% out-of-the-money, meaning that the stock price would have to more than double for them to begin to have intrinsic value. A full third of the options granted are more than 30% underwater.

Percent Change From Exercise Price	Underwater Grants	% of Underwater
0% to -10%	29	25%
-10% to -20%	32	28%
-20% to -30%	16	14%
-30% to -40%	19	17%
-40% to -50%	5	4%
-50%+	13	11%
Total	114	–

When we look at the underwater stock options by industry, we find that there are differences in the percentage of underwater options and the degree to which they are underwater across industry sectors. For example, all five Communications Services companies had underwater options that were on average 33% underwater. Underwater options were much less of an issue in the Information Technology sector, where companies have recently been rallying and recovering from share price depression.

Handling Underwater Stock Option Concerns

Underwater stock options can create retention issues throughout organizations. In times of economic uncertainty and poor stock market conditions, employees rightfully may worry that underwater stock options will never achieve the upside that was once promised. Executives may feel that their outstanding underwater stock option awards are worthless, which may leave them feeling demotivated to remain at the company for the long haul. Similarly, younger employees who are holding stock options that are deeply underwater may look for more attractive opportunities at high-growth potential organizations. Moving on to a new company may become more appealing, especially if the offer includes a sign-on award at a new employer which may represent a fresh start from an equity compensation perspective. In general, employees may not consider the long-term potential of their stock options and instead focus on the current lack of value.

To mitigate these potential retention concerns, employers need to provide clear messaging to employees about the long-term potential provided by stock options, and potentially consider redesigning their equity grant practices. Among the S&P 500 sample, the most common (84%) exercise term for stock option grants is 10 years. This decade-long time horizon should provide plenty of opportunity for the share price to recover, and potentially grow far beyond the exercise price. On the flip side, currently depressed share prices also mean that the next annual stock option awards will be granted at a lower exercise price and therefore should have more upside potential over the new term.

If employees have been put off by multiple cycles of underwater options, another alternative to consider is redesigning and rebalancing the equity compensation mix. Among the S&P 500 sample, stock options represent 19% of the average equity compensation package. Excluding CEOs who do not receive options, the average CEO receives 38% of equity compensation in stock option awards. Most S&P 500 companies use multiple equity vehicles and place more weight on full-value share awards in their long-term incentive plans, which is a market best practice and shields executive compensation packages from excessive macroeconomic risk. While stock options continue to make sense at growth-stage companies, the associated retention and recruitment risks in times of share price depression may cause mature companies to fall behind in the war for talent.

Conclusion

Periods of economic uncertainty raise many compensation issues as companies look to properly incentivize and retain key talent despite depressed stock prices. While stock options remain appropriate for incentivizing employees at growth-stage companies, mature organizations must strike the right balance of equity compensation to navigate the retention and recruitment risks during these periods. With extreme stock market volatility expected to continue in the coming years, companies may benefit from emphasizing equity compensation based on multi-year financial goals and relative stock price performance rather than boom-or-bust stock option grants. Whether or not an equity program redesign is under consideration, clear communication about the future potential of equity awards, including underwater options, remains vital.